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“Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when 
criminal trials are fair . . . .”1 
I. INTRODUCTION
Jim McDonnell was elected Sheriff of Los Angeles County in 2014 on 
the heels of Lee Baca’s early retirement.2  Baca was plagued by controversy 
for years,3 and his attempts to cover up misconduct within the department
ultimately led to his conviction for obstruction.4  Consequently, McDonnell’s 
first move as Sheriff was to establish a panel of commanders tasked with
reviewing Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD) personnel and identifying
deputies with founded allegations of misconduct.5  McDonnell planned to
disclose this information to the prosecutorial offices that handle LASD cases 
to strengthen the integrity of criminal investigations and prosecutions.6 
The reform effort quickly hit a barrier with a history originating in that
same department.7  In a 1974 case against Los Angeles County Sheriff, 
Peter Pitchess, the California Supreme Court held that criminal defendants 
could access peace officer personnel records.8  For four years following 
1. 	  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
2. Rick Orlov, Election 2014: Jim McDonnell Defeats Paul Tanaka to Become 
Los Angeles County Sheriff, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 28, 2017, 7:22 AM), http://www.daily
news.com/2014/11/04/election-2014-jim-mcdonnell-defeats-paul-tanaka-to-become-los­
angeles-county-sheriff/ [https://perma.cc/FNG3-2DDD].
3. 	See Sheriff Lee Baca to Retire at End of the Month, CBS L.A. (Jan. 7, 2014, 
10:45 AM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2014/01/07/sheriff-lee-baca-expected-to-step­
down-after-16-years-of-service/ [https://perma.cc/YE6X-4DPD].
4. Ex-LA County Sheriff Lee Baca Convicted in Jail Corruption Case, CBS
NEWS (Mar. 15, 2017, 6:16 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ex-la-county-sheriff­
lee-baca-found-guilty-in-jail-corruption-case/ [https://perma.cc/M7CX-QERZ].  Baca, who was 
recently diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, was eventually given a three-year sentence
but continues to appeal his case. Ex-Sheriff Lee Baca Asks 9th Circuit to Let Him Remain Free
During Appeal, L.A. TIMES (July 24, 2017, 9:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/ la-
me-baca-20170724-story.html [https://perma.cc/E5EC-U9HB].  Baca petitioned the Ninth
Circuit in late July of 2017 to allow him to remain free while he appeals his conviction.  Id.
 5. Frank Stoltze, What’s Behind the Fight over the Identities of 300 Problem LA 
Sheriff’s Deputies, KPCC (July 13, 2017), http://www.scpr.org/news/2017/07/13/73772/ 
what-s-behind-the-fight-over-the-identities-of-300/ [https://perma.cc/XX86-58ZM].
6. 	Id.
 7. 	See generally Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531 (1974). 
8. Id. at 538–40.  Sheriff Pitchess, known for modernizing the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department during his twenty-three-year tenure, was both revered within the law 
enforcement community and highly criticized by the public.  Myrna Oliver, Peter Pitchess, 
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the decision, law enforcement agencies, their unions, and prosecutorial offices
railed against what they considered to be court-endorsed “fishing expeditions” 
into personnel files.9  Animosity toward access to personnel files shaped 
the statutory codification of Pitchess in 1978, which made personnel files 
confidential.10 Now, Pitchess confidentiality threatens to foreclose Sheriff 
McDonnell’s reform efforts and erode the due process rights afforded to
criminal defendants in Brady v. Maryland.11 
This Note will address the tension created by Association for Los Angeles 
Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court (ALADS), in which the California Court 
of Appeal for the Second District held that disclosing to prosecutors the
names of peace officers with potential Brady material in their personnel 
files violates Pitchess confidentiality.12  Part II will briefly survey the
backdrop against which the Pitchess statutes were passed and the inherent
conflict between Pitchess and Brady. Part III will dissect the appellate 
court’s decision in ALADS and argue that the decision misapplied California 
Supreme Court precedent.  Finally, Part IV will discuss the future of Pitchess
and Brady in light of the California Supreme Court’s upcoming review of 
the case and offer possible solutions to the Pitchess/Brady problem. 
II. BACKGROUND
Prosecutorial Brady obligations and statutory Pitchess confidentiality 
developed in two very different contexts, despite the decisions sharing similar 
underlying rationales.13  The tension that exists between the two doctrines
Sheriff Who Modernized Agency, Dies, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 1999), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
1999/apr/05/news/mn-24341 [https://perma.cc/6JPC-29DW].  Pitchess, like Sheriff McDonnell, 
sought to reform the department by vigorously investigating officer misconduct.  Id. He 
died in 1999 at the age of eighty-seven. Id.
9. Katherine J. Bies, Note, Let the Sunshine in: Illuminating the Powerful Role 
Police Unions Play in Shielding Officer Misconduct, 28 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 109, 130
(2017) (citation omitted). 
10. Id. at 129–32; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7 (West 2018) (“Peace officer
or custodial officer personnel records . . . or information obtained from these records, are 
confidential . . . .”).
11.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
12. Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court (ALADS), 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
51, 68, 73 (Ct. App. 2017). 
13. Brady announced a due process right to favorable evidence for criminal defendants
and Pitchess articulated a discovery process grounded in fundamental fairness. Compare
Brady, 373 U.S. at 86, with Pitchess, 11 Cal. 3d at 538–40. 
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stems from the fact that the legislature’s codification of Pitchess failed to 
account for prosecutorial Brady obligations.14 
A. Prosecutorial Brady Obligations
In Brady, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires prosecutors to turn over evidence
favorable to criminal defendants when that evidence would be “material 
either to guilt or to punishment.”15  The Court’s subsequent decisions further 
defined Brady requirements for prosecutors: Brady material must be turned 
over regardless of whether the defense makes a request,16 and the obligation 
extends to evidence in the possession of the entire prosecutorial team,
“including the police.”17 Brady material also includes impeachment material:18 
evidence of dishonest acts, bias, motive, and any other evidence tending
to affect witness credibility.19  Such evidence falls under Brady because
the credibility of a witness is often “determinative of guilt or innocence”20 
and is vital to cases that hinge on peace officer testimony.21 
While Brady requires prosecutors to disclose favorable evidence to the
defense, Brady did not create a general constitutional right to discovery in 
criminal cases.22  Nowhere is this distinction more overt than in the case 
of impeachment evidence.  Even though Brady requires disclosure of 
14. See Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel 
Files and the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 763 (2015). 
15. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86–87.  Evidence is material when it has a “reasonable
probability” of affecting the outcome of a case, with “reasonable probability” being “a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the [case’s] outcome.”  United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694
(1984)).  In assessing materiality, courts look to how the undisclosed evidence, as a whole, 
may or may not have affected the outcome of the case, rather than the probative value of
each individual peace of Brady material. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436–37 (1995).
Additionally, it is important to note that even an inadvertent failure to disclosure material
evidence can constitute a Brady violation.  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). 
16.  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111–12 (1976). 
17. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437–40.  The prosecutorial team comprises all those acting
“on the government’s behalf,” including the police agency that investigated the crime. Id.
at 437.  Knowledge of evidence favorable to the defense held by members of the prosecutorial
team is automatically imparted on the prosecutor who is liable for the disclosure of all 
exculpatory information or evidence that any member of the prosecutorial “team actually 
or constructively possesses.”  In re Steele, 32 Cal. 4th 682, 697 (2004) (quoting People v. 
Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 4th 1305, 1315 (2000)). 
18.  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–55 (1972). 
19. R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem 
of Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1437–38 (2011). 
20. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). 
21. Abel, supra note 14, at 751. 
22. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (“There is no general constitutional 
right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one . . . .”).
732
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impeachment evidence, there is no mandate as to when such a disclosure
must occur because Brady is not a constitutional discovery doctrine.23  To
the contrary, the United States Supreme Court explicitly held that under
Brady such evidence does not need to be disclosed to a criminal defendant 
before the individual enters into a guilty plea.24 
B. The Pitchess Decision
Ten years after Brady, the California Supreme Court addressed the pretrial 
disclosure of peace officer personnel records.25  The court held that criminal 
defendants could compel the discovery of information from a peace officer’s
personnel file by demonstrating that the requested information would 
“facilitate the ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial.”26  Such discovery 
“is based on the fundamental proposition that [the defendant] is entitled 
to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably
accessible information.”27  Notably, Pitchess was decided on state-law grounds
and never mentioned prosecutorial Brady obligations to disclose such
evidence.28 
23. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (citing Weatherford, 429 U.S. 
at 559). 
24. Id.  The Court in Ruiz reasoned that the limited value of impeachment evidence
was outweighed by the government’s interest in procuring plea bargains “that are factually
justified, desired by defendants, and help to secure the efficient administration of justice.” 
Id. at 631.  Lower courts initially took the Ruiz decision as an indication that Brady disclosure 
requirements as a whole are less applicable in the pretrial plea bargain context, but the
Supreme Court has since moved in the opposition direction, indicating a willingness to
regulate the plea bargain process through the application of Brady disclosure. Lafler v. 
Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 157, 174 (2012); see also Gerard Fowke, Note, Material to Whom?: 
Implementing Brady’s Duty to Disclose at Trial and During Plea Bargaining, 50 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 575, 590–92 (2013). 
25. See Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 539–40 (1974). 
26. Id. at 536.  Today, the scope of Pitchess motions has expanded to include lying
or falsifying police reports, fabricating evidence, planting evidence, orientation bias, coerced 
confessions, and officer code of silence allegations.  Michael Lampert, “Disinfecting with
Sunlight”: Lessons from the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department Decision Affirming
Hearing Officer Subpoena Powers in Public Safety Officer Discipline Cases, 66 LAB. L.J.
126, 127 (2015). 
27. Pitchess, 11 Cal. 3d at 535 (citing Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 812, 816 (1974)).
28. Miguel A. Neri, Pitchess v. Brady: The Need for Legislative Reform of California’s 
Confidentiality Protection for Peace-Officer Personnel Information, 43 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 301, 306 (2012).  The decision was written by one of California’s most distinguished 
jurists, Justice Stanley Mosk, who served on the court for thirty-seven years and wrote
1,500 opinions. Stanley Mosk, 88, Long a California Supreme Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES
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1. The Pitchess Statutes 
Following the Pitchess decision, police agencies, their unions, and 
prosecutorial offices began a campaign to prevent criminal defendants
from accessing peace officer personnel files.29 In one particularly dramatic
episode, the Los Angeles City Attorney and the LAPD conspired to shred 
records of complaints against officers as a way of preventing discovery.30 
The LAPD covertly destroyed four tons of police files during a single 
month in 1976.31  Judges were forced to dismiss over 100 cases connected 
to the destroyed files when the shredding came to light.32 
Against this backdrop, the California legislature began drafting a statutory 
codification of the Pitchess process, the purpose of which would be to narrow
the Pitchess holding and limit the disclosure of peace officer personnel 
files.33  The California Attorney General drafted the bill and noted that the 
law would stop “unreasonable and bad faith efforts to obtain access to a 
peace officer’s personnel file.”34  The California Highway Patrol advised
that overzealous attorneys looking to turn the heads of jury members prompted
the need for the law.35  Police unions wrote that the law would stop “fishing
expeditions” used to escape criminal charges.36 
The legislation codified the Pitchess procedure and confidentiality in 
Penal Code §§ 832.7 and 832.8, as well as Evidence Code §§ 1043 through
1045.37  The law makes two types of records confidential: (1) peace officer 
(June 21, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/21/us/stanley-mosk-88-long-a-california- 
supreme-court-justice.html.
29. See Bies, supra note 9, at 127. 
30. Id.
 31. Id.  Record shredding became a concern for the drafters of the Pitchess statutes 
and may help to explain why the statute sought to curtail access to personnel files. See
Neri, supra note 28, at 307. 
32. Bies, supra note 9, at 127.
 33. Abel, supra note 14, at 763; Bies, supra note 9, at 129.  That the Pitchess statutes
were not meant to strengthen the rights of the accused, but rather to strengthen the ability
of police agencies to curtail access to exculpatory evidence, can in part be understood through 
the lens of public choice theory. See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, 
and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights 
of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L.REV. 1079, 1081 (1993).  California legislators, following the
Pitchess decision, faced mounting pressure from a powerful interest group—peace officer
unions—coupled with considerable political risks in taking the side of criminal defendants. 
See id. at 1088–95.  At the same time, they had few disincentives to gratifying peace officer
unions, which they could do at no consequence to taxpayers. See id. at 1095.  In this context, 
the decision to curtail the rights of criminal defendants can be understood as a rational
outcome of the political incentives that cause legislatures to undervalue the rights of the 
accused. See id. at 1095–96. 
34. Neri, supra note 28, at 306 (citation omitted). 
35. Bies, supra note 9, at 129 (citation omitted). 
36. Id. at 130. 
37.  City of Santa Cruz v. Mun. Court, 49 Cal. 3d 74, 81 (1989). 
734
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personnel records and all information obtained from them, and (2) records 
of citizen complaints.38  Under the statutory scheme, disclosure in criminal or
civil proceedings can occur only upon a motion showing the materiality 
of the information sought and a belief that the police agency has the records.39 
Once disclosure is triggered, a judge conducts an in camera review of the 
file and determines what records, if any, to disclose.40 
In practice, the moving party must demonstrate a link between the proposed
defense and how the information sought would support the defense or 
impeach the testifying officer’s version of events.41  Because the defendant is
often seeking information to impeach an officer-witness,42 such evidence 
regularly falls under Brady.43 However, the Pitchess statutes, like their judicial- 
decision counterpart, make no mention of prosecutorial Brady obligations.44 
The statutes are void of legal provisions that would facilitate prosecutors’ 
compliance with Brady because the California legislature failed to take 
Brady into account when drafting the law.45 
C. The Pitchess/Brady Tension 
Pitchess confidentiality acts as a barrier to the disclosure of Brady material.
Brady requires prosecutors to disclose material evidence—including 
impeachment evidence—held by any member of the prosecutorial team.46 
At the same time, Pitchess confidentiality limits prosecutorial access to
peace officers’ personnel files.47  Thus, prosecutors cannot assess whether
there is Brady material in an officer’s personnel file without first making 
a Pitchess motion.48
 38. CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7 (West 2018). 
39. Id.; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1043.
40. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1045. The statutes exclude from disclosure complaints that
are more than five years old, any conclusions made by officers investigating the complaints, 
and any facts “so remote as to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit.” Id. Courts 
generally disclose nothing more than “the names, addresses, and telephone numbers 
of complainants and witnesses, [as well as the] dates of the alleged incidents.” Neri, supra
note 28, at 314. 
41.  People v. Superior Court (Johnson), 61 Cal. 4th 696, 720 (2015). 
42. Id. at 722. 
43. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–40 (1995). 
44. Neri, supra note 28, at 309. 
45. Id.
 46. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. 
47. See Alford v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 1033, 1054 (2003). 
48.  People v. Gutierrez, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 138, 146–47 (Ct. App. 2003). 
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The Pitchess statutes create practical barriers to conducting such an
assessment.  Prosecutors must satisfy the good cause requirement of a
Pitchess motion before disclosure can occur.49  This means a prosecutor 
must allege plausible misconduct on the part of the officer-witness and
link that misconduct to a defense theory.50  Were this practicable, the
resulting disclosure still would be subject to the limitations found in the
Pitchess statutes.51  There remains a significant risk that a criminal defendant 
will be left without material to which he or she is constitutionally entitled.52 
1. The Rise of Brady Lists
Police agencies developed their own solution to the Pitchess/Brady
problem.  By 2015, several counties had begun systematically reviewing 
personnel files for potential Brady information and compiling the names 
of officers with founded allegations of misconduct into “Brady lists.”53  A
name would be turned over to a prosecutor any time an officer was a
material witness in a case so that the prosecutor could make a Pitchess motion 
to review the file for Brady material or notify defense counsel to allow the 
defense to make a Pitchess motion.54 
The California Supreme Court briefly discussed, in dicta, the use of Brady
lists in People v. Superior Court (Johnson), where disclosure from a Brady
list occurred.55 The court held that prosecutors are required to file a Pitchess
49. California Evidence Code § 1043 makes no distinction between prosecutorial
and defense Pitchess motions when it describes the particular showing necessary to trigger
review. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1043 (West 2018). 
50. See Warrick v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 4th 1011, 1018 (2005).  Requiring a 
prosecutor to think and act as a defense attorney is an impediment to successful prosecutorial
Pitchess motions, in part because prosecutors do not have access to the criminal defendant’s
version of events, but also because prosecutors are not naturally disposed to thinking and 
acting for the benefit of the defense. See Alex Kozinski, Preface, Criminal Law 2.0, 44
GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., at iii, xxvii (2015) (noting the inherent difficulty for
prosecutors to think and act as defense attorneys).
51. Neri, supra note 28, at 315. 
52. Id.
 53. Abel, supra note 14, at 764–65, 773.  Several District Attorney’s offices have 
also begun compiling their own internal Brady lists.  Jeff McDonald, DA Keeps Secret List
of Bad Cops, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (July 26, 2014, 11:31 AM), http://www.sandiegounion 
tribune.com/news/watchdog/sdut-da-secret-brady-list-bad-cops-2014jul26-htmlstory.html 
[https://perma.cc/R52K-YXJM?type=image].
54. Abel, supra note 14, at 764–65. 
55. People v. Superior Court (Johnson), 61 Cal. 4th 696, 706 (2015) (citing Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). Johnson itself did not present the use of Brady lists 
as a material issue and instead focused on the ability of prosecutors to access personnel 
files after the initial disclosure from the Brady list occurs. Id. at 711–13. As for any continuing 
Brady obligation upon disclosure from a Brady list, the court held that a prosecutor is only
required to inform defense counsel of the fact that she was notified that potential Brady
material exists. Id. at 716.  As the court put it, “[t]he prosecutor ha[s] no constitutional
736
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motion to gain access to personnel files, even after they are notified of the 
existence of potential Brady information.56  However, the court never took
issue with the disclosure of names from the Brady list. Rather, the court
praised the use of the procedure: “In this case, the police department has 
laudably established procedures to streamline the Pitchess/Brady process.”57 
For a time, Brady lists appeared to be the solution to the Pitchess/Brady
problem.  Prosecutors fulfilled their disclosure obligations, and defendants
gained access to exculpatory evidence.  However, peace officers and their 
unions felt the use of Brady lists threatened the protections established by 
the Pitchess statutes.58 




The LASD panel finished reviewing personnel files in October of 2016
and found misconduct in the records of 300 deputies whose names were 
then compiled into a Brady list.59  The LASD intended to disclose this list
to the prosecutorial offices that regularly handled LASD cases but refused
to divulge the types of misconduct, the results of investigations into the
allegations, or any disciplinary actions that followed.60  The policy appeared
to comply with Johnson’s mandate that prosecutors be required to file a
Pitchess motion before accessing personnel files following the initial disclosure 
from the list.61  Further, the policy would minimize prosecutorial liability 
duty to conduct defendant’s investigation for him.” Id. at 715 (quoting People v. Morrison, 
34 Cal. 4th 698, 715 (2004)). 
56. Johnson, 61 Cal. 4th at 714. 
57. Id. at 721 (emphasis added). 
58. See Tim White, Does the Brady Issue Impact You?, ALADS DISPATCHER 20,
Nov. 2016, at 20, 20, https://alads.blob.core.windows.net/wfiles/dispatcher/pdf/pdf_XXXIII 
_11.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V4R-P9VW] (describing the use of Brady lists by the LASD 
as a “diabolical plan [and a] detrimental, career and morale killing scheme[]”). 
59. Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court (ALADS), 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
51, 59–60 (Ct. App. 2017).  The categories of misconduct included in the panel’s investigation
were “(1) Immoral Conduct, (2) Bribes, Rewards, Loans, Gifts, Favors, (3) Misappropriate 
of Property, (4) Tampering with Evidence, (5) False Statements, (6) Failure to Make 
Statements and/or Making False Statements During Departmental Internal Investigations, 
(7) Obstructing an Investigation/Influencing a Witness, (8) False Information in Records, 
(9) Policy of Equality—Discriminatory Harassment, (10) Unreasonable Force, and (11) 
Family Violence.” Id. at 60 (citations omitted).
60. Id.  The LASD went so far as to send letters to affected deputies, stating that no
portion of their personnel files would be disclosed absent a Pitchess motion. Id.
 61. Johnson, 61 Cal. 4th at 714; see also ALADS, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 60. 
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under California Penal Code § 141, which in 2016 made it a felony for
prosecutors to willfully falsify or withhold evidence.62 
The union representing Los Angeles sheriff’s deputies filed suit on 
November 10, 2016, seeking to enjoin the LASD from implementing the
policy.63  The trial court held that, once a peace officer on a Brady list is 
slated to be a material witness in a criminal proceeding, Brady requires 
the disclosure of the officer’s name to the prosecutor.64  Although the disclosure
of the name would violate Pitchess confidentiality, Brady overrode the 
state-law restrictions.65  The court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting
the LASD from disclosing the Brady list or individuals on it, except when 
(1) the deputy becomes a potential witness in a criminal prosecution or (2)
a court order compels disclosure following a Pitchess motion.66 
A. The Decision of the Court of Appeal
The union filed an immediate petition for a writ of mandate from the
court of appeal seeking to strike those portions of the injunction that allowed
LASD to disclose names from the Brady list without first complying with 
the Pitchess statutes.67  Thus, the court addressed the following questions: 
(1) are the names of deputies on the Brady list in and of themselves 
confidential?; and (2) if the names are confidential, does Pitchess confidentiality
prevent their disclosure once an officer becomes a potential material
witness?68 
Based on Johnson and the dicta within it, the answer to these questions
should have been no. Nowhere in Johnson did the California Supreme
Court take issue with the police department’s initial disclosure of officers’
names to the prosecutor’s office.  In dicta, the court praised the use of the 
Brady list and used the existence of the list to fashion parts of its central 
62. CAL. PENAL CODE § 141 (West 2018); see also Tony Saavedra, New law:
Prosecutors Face Felonies if They Falsify or Withhold Evidence, ORANGE COUNTY REG. 
(Oct. 2, 2016, 7:35 AM), http://www.ocregister.com/2016/10/02/new-law-prosecutors­
face-felonies-if-they-falsify-or-withhold-evidence/ [https://perma.cc/K49T-SQUS]. The
law was passed largely in reaction to revelations of misconduct within the Orange County
District Attorney’s office. Id.
 63. ALADS, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 61. 
64. Id. at 62–63. 
65. Id. at 62
 66. Id. at 64.  The trial court included a series of “‘clarifying’ principles” meant to
specify the scope of the injunction. Id.  These principles noted that the LASD was not 
precluded by any part of the injunction from creating and maintaining an internal Brady
list, from using membership on the Brady list as a basis for deputy reassignment, or from 
disclosing to prosecutors future Brady lists that include only non-sworn employees.  Id.
 67. Id.
 68. See id. at 66. 
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holding.69  In accordance with Johnson, the appellate court should have
upheld the LASD’s ability to make a disclosure limited to an officer’s name
and presence on a Brady list. 
However, such a ruling would have been a clear blow to the overarching
goal of the Pitchess statutes—curtailing disclosure of peace officer personnel 
records.70  That would prove too difficult for the court to accept, given the
longstanding endorsement of Pitchess confidentiality by police agencies, 
unions, prosecutors, and lower courts in California.71 Instead, the court 
held that the names of officers on the Brady list are themselves confidential 
and cannot be disclosed.72 
1. The Confidentiality of Names: The Copley Press Cases
The appellate court relied on a series of cases, referred to here as the 
Copley Press cases,73 to support the conclusion that peace officers’ names
are themselves confidential.74  The Copley Press cases involved various
news agencies’ California Public Records Act (CPRA) requests for documents
either located in or connected to peace officer personnel files.75  The cases
sought to determine the extent of allowable disclosure in light of Pitchess
confidentiality.76  Ultimately, the Copley Press cases struck a balance between
69. People v. Superior Court (Johnson), 61 Cal. 4th 696, 720–21 (2015) (citing 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). 
70. See Abel, supra note 14, at 763. 
71. See Neri, supra note 28, at 303–04; Bies, supra note 9, at 129–31. 
72. ALADS, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 68 (citing Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court, 39
Cal. 4th 1272, 1297 (2006)). 
73. The Copley Press line of cases are Long Beach Police Officers Ass’n v. City of 
Long Beach, 59 Cal. 4th 59 (2014); Commission on Peace Officers Standards & Training
v. Superior Court (POST), 42 Cal. 4th 278 (2007); and Copley Press, 39 Cal. 4th 1272. 
74. ALADS, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 68 (citing Copley Press, 39 Cal. 4th at 1297). 
75. Long Beach, 59 Cal. 4th at 64; POST, 42 Cal. 4th at 284, 286; Copley Press, 39
Cal. 4th at 1279. 
76. Long Beach, 59 Cal. 4th at 67–69, 71; POST, 42 Cal. 4th at 292–93; see also 
Copley Press, 39 Cal. 4th at 1282, 1284–85.  Pitchess confidentiality became an issue in 
the context of CPRA disclosure because the CPRA explicitly “does not require the
disclosure of . . .[r]ecords, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to
federal or state law, including, but not limited to, provisions of the Evidence Code relating 
to privilege.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254(k) (West 2018). This portion of the CPRA 
incorporates the Pitchess statutes and the prohibitions against disclosure within them.
Copley Press, 39 Cal. 4th at 1307 (first citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254(k); and then citing 
CBS, Inc. v. Block, 42 Cal. 3d 646, 656 (1986)). One other provision of the CPRA appears 
to mirror the language of the Pitchess statutes: § 6254(c) exempts from disclosure “[p]ersonnel, 
medical, or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion 
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records of factual information about an incident, which are not confidential, 
and records generated as part of an internal investigation of an officer in 
connection with an incident, which are confidential.77 
The California Supreme Court first addressed the disclosure of peace 
officer names in Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court and took an expansive
view of Pitchess confidentiality.78  The court held that Pitchess confidentiality 
extends beyond criminal and civil proceedings to third party disclosures.79 
Thus, Pitchess confidentiality creates a barrier to the release of peace 
officer personnel records following a CPRA request.80  The court relied primarily 
on the legislative history and plain language of the Pitchess statutes to further 
hold that Pitchess confidentiality protects the names of peace officers from
disclosure.81 
Although Copley Press applied a broad reading of Pitchess confidentiality, 
the California Supreme Court backpedaled on disclosure restrictions just
one year later in Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training v. 
Superior Court (POST).82  The reporter in POST sought names and records
unrelated to disciplinary actions or complaints.83  The court moderated its 
application of the Pitchess statutes and qualified its ruling in Copley Press
by holding that the names of officers are generally not confidential unless 
disclosure of an officer’s name would directly link that officer to private 
information found in a personnel file.84 
The final case in the Copley Press triad adhered to the narrow reading 
of Pitchess confidentiality found in POST.85  In Long Beach Officers
of personal privacy.”  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254(c).  However, the California Supreme
Court has held that this provision does not exempt entire personnel files, only those 
portions where the privacy interests of peace officers outweigh the public’s interest in
disclosure.  POST, 42 Cal. 4th at 299 (quoting CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254(c)).
77. Long Beach, 59 Cal. 4th at 72. 
78. See Copley Press, 39 Cal. 4th at 1297–98. 
79. Id. at 1284–85. 
80. See id. at 1285–86.  The reporter in Copley Press sought records related to a 
closed hearing in which a deputy sheriff appealed his termination from the San Diego County
Sheriff’s Department. Id. at 1279.  The reporter had previously attempted to gain access 
to the hearing but was denied. Id.
 81. Id. at 1297.  Since the passage of the Pitchess statutes, peace officer personnel
files are one area where California courts have consistently erred on the side of curbing
disclosure under CPRA requests. In other areas, courts have continuously narrowed those 
provisions of the CPRA that seek to protect public employee privacy.  Alexandra B. Andreen,
Comment, The Cost of Sunshine: The Threat to Public Employee Privacy Posed by the 
California Public Records Act, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 869, 870, 893 (2015). 
82. Commission on Peace Officers Standards & Training v. Superior Court (POST),
42 Cal. 4th 278, 295–96 (2007). 
83. Id. at 286. 
84. Id. at 295–96, 298–99. 
85. Long Beach Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Long Beach, 59 Cal. 4th 59, 72– 
73 (2014). 
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Association v. City of Long Beach, the court allowed the disclosure of the 
names of officers involved in shootings during a five-year period despite 
the fact that the disclosure linked those officers to investigations of the
shootings found within their personnel files.86  The court further limited 
its decision in Copley Press, interpreting the case as merely restricting the 
disclosure of records generated in connection with an appraisal or discipline.87 
Thus, under Long Beach, records of factual information about an incident 
could be disclosed, but records generated as part of an internal investigation
into that officer’s conduct remained confidential.88 
In stark contrast to ALADS, the Copley Press cases involved public 
disclosures to news outlets.89  The court relaxed Pitchess confidentiality
in this highly public setting where no competing constitutional interest
existed.90  It should logically follow, then, that in a context where disclosure 
is not as public—or arguably not public at all—and where a constitutional 
interest conflicts with confidentiality, courts should err on the side of allowing
the disclosure. 
The ALADS court instead relied on the Copley Press cases to prevent 
the disclosure of officer names by holding that the names themselves are
confidential.91  The court’s reliance is misguided for two reasons.  First, 
the court disregarded the difference between disclosure to prosecutors and 
disclosure to news outlets.92  Prosecutors and police agencies are both part 
of the prosecutorial team under longstanding Brady case law.93  The
 86. Id. at 71–72.  The reporter was seeking records of police-involved shootings 
following the killing of thirty-five-year-old Douglas Zerby by two Long Beach City police 
officers. Id. at 64.  The unarmed Zerby was shot while holding a water hose nozzle, which
police mistook for a handgun.  Richard Winton & Ruben Vives, Family of Man Killed by
Long Beach Officers Awarded $6.5 Million, L.A.TIMES (Apr. 4, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2013/apr/04/local/la-me—water-nozzle-verdict-20130405 [https://perma.cc/33DX-BNA9].
Zerby’s family was awarded $6.5 million by a Santa Ana jury following the shooting. Id.
 87. Long Beach, 59 Cal. 4th at 72–73. 
88. Id. The court acknowledged the fact that the Pitchess statutes are silent as to
whether names are protected from disclosure.  Id. at 65.  The POST court similarly noted that, 
had the Legislature intended on preventing the disclosure of names of peace officers, it 
very well could have included “names” on the list of “personal data” made confidential by
§ 832.8. POST, 61 Cal. 4th at 298 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 832.8 (West 2018)).
89. See Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court (ALADS), 221 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 51, 83–84 (Ct. App. 2017) (Grimes, J., dissenting). 
90. See Long Beach, 59 Cal. 4th at 72–73. 
91. ALADS, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 68, 79–80. 
92. See id. at 68–69. 
93. See In re Steele, 32 Cal. 4th 682, 697 (2004); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 
437–38 (1995). 
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dissemination of information between members of the prosecutorial team
is distinguishable from disclosure to news outlets that intend to publish 
that information to the public at large.94  The appellate court dismissed this
distinction, choosing instead to apply the broad confidentiality standard
set down in Copley Press without any regard for the context in which that 
case was decided.95 
Second, the court applied the broad ruling found in Copley Press while 
ignoring the decisions in POST and Long Beach that followed it.96 POST
established a baseline that names themselves are not confidential, subject
to certain exceptions.97 Long Beach clarified that Pitchess confidentiality 
applies to the disclosure of records generated as part of internal investigations 
or disciplinary actions resulting from an officer’s conduct.98  Names, then, 
are only confidential when they link an officer to the results of internal
investigations or disciplinary actions.99 
The names on a Brady list do not fall within this exception because the
names themselves only link the officer to factual information about an 
incident, which Long Beach held was not confidential under the Pitchess
statutes.100  Disclosure of a Brady list officer indicates to the prosecutor 
that the officer’s file may contain Brady material.  Without more, disclosure 
does not link that officer to the results of investigations or disciplinary 
actions.101  To the contrary, such records remain confidential and undisclosed.102 
Thus, under the Copley Press cases, and Long Beach in particular, the names
of officers on Brady lists should not be confidential.103 
2. The Disclosure of Confidential Names 
The ALADS court then had the task of reconciling Brady disclosure 
requirements with its conclusion that the names of peace officers on Brady
lists are confidential.  The court chose to ignore the conflict altogether 
94. ALADS, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 84 (Grimes, J., dissenting). 
95. See id. at 68–69. 
96. See id.
 97. See Commission on Peace Officers Standards & Training v. Superior Court
(POST), 42 Cal. 4th 278, 298 (2007); see also Long Beach Police Officers Ass’n v. City
of Long Beach, 59 Cal. 4th 59, 71–73 (2014). 
98. Long Beach, 59 Cal. 4th at 71–72. 
99. Id. at 72. 
100. Id. at 72–73. 
101. See ALADS, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 60.
102. Id.
103. The Court in Long Beach stressed the importance of not reading § 832.8 “so
broadly as to include every record that might be considered for purposes of an officer’s 
appraisal or discipline, for such a broad reading of the statute would sweep virtually all 
law enforcement records into the protected category of ‘personnel records.’” Long Beach, 
59 Cal. 4th at 71–72 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 832.8 (West 2018)). 
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rather than acknowledge and grapple with the existence of a real tension
between prosecutorial Brady obligations and the Pitchess statutes.104 
The ALADS court first noted that the California Supreme Court reviewed
the Pitchess statutes in People v. Mooc and City of Los Angeles v. Superior 
Court (Brandon), finding in both cases that Pitchess confidentiality violated 
neither Brady nor constitutional due process.105  This conclusion omits several 
crucial details. In Mooc, the California Supreme Court reviewed only the 
procedural requirements of disclosure under the Pitchess statutes.106 In 
no portion of the decision did the court engage in a substantive analysis
of the constitutionality of Pitchess confidentiality in light of Brady disclosure
or due process requirements.107 
Brandon did address the constitutionality of one portion of the Pitchess
statutes: the disclosure and destruction of complaints older than five years.108 
Although the court concluded that this portion of the Pitchess statutes did 
not violate Brady or due process, the court explicitly reserved the question 
of whether Pitchess confidentiality would be unconstitutional were it to 
bar prosecutorial access to personnel files for Brady review.109  To say, then,
that Mooc and Brandon do not suggest any tension between Brady obligations 
and Pitchess confidentiality ignores the fact that the issue was never discussed 
in Mooc and was specifically set aside in Brandon. 
The ALADS court then looked to the recent holding in People v. Gutierrez
that Pitchess confidentiality did not infringe on Brady disclosure requirements.110 
The court of appeal in Gutierrez relied on a theory of reconciliation: because
the threshold necessary to trigger Pitchess disclosure is lower than the standard 
for disclosure under Brady, a failure to make a showing under Pitchess
104. This is largely what other lower courts have done: shield Pitchess confidentiality 
from any hint of conflict with Brady obligations. Abel, supra note 14, at 763; Neri, supra
note 28, at 311. 
105. ALADS, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 71. 
106.  People v. Mooc, 26 Cal. 4th 1216, 1228–32 (2001). 
107. The Mooc decision contains only one citation to Brady and one reference to the 
Due Process Clause. Id. at 1226–27. 
108.  City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Brandon), 29 Cal. 4th 1, 10–13 (2002). 
109. Id. at 12 n.2 (“Because it is not presented here, we do not reach the question of
whether Penal Code section 832.7, which precludes disclosure of officer records ‘except 
by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code,’ would be 
constitutional if it were applied to defeat the right of the prosecutor to obtain access to 
officer personnel records in order to comply with Brady.”).
110. ALADS, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 71–72; see also People v. Gutierrez, 6 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 138, 145–46 (Ct. App. 2003). 
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necessarily means that no Brady disclosure is required.111 This theory largely 
disregards the fact that Pitchess disclosure hinges on a showing of known 
or suspected misconduct.112  On the other hand, Brady is an expedition into 
evidence largely unknown to the criminal defendant.113  If Brady evidence
inside a personnel file is also unknown to the prosecutor, then Pitchess
confidentiality will prevent constitutionally required disclosure from 
occurring.114 
In sum, the appellate court’s reliance on Mooc, Brandon, and Gutierrez
is largely misplaced.  These cases do not adequately support Pitchess
curtailment of prosecutorial Brady obligations, nor do they provide a sound
basis for preventing police agencies from disclosing the names of officers 
with potential Brady information in their personnel files to prosecutors. 
a. Dealing with Johnson
The ALADS court’s analysis of Johnson—where the California Supreme 
Court addressed the use of Brady lists in dicta—contradicts its reliance on 
Mooc and Brandon. The court cited Mooc and Brandon as authority 
for Pitchess confidentiality posing no conflict to Brady disclosure—a 
proposition not considered in those opinions.115  However, when it came 
to Johnson, the court disregarded the California Supreme Court’s praise 
of Brady lists.116  The court instead relied on the axiom that “[a]n opinion 
is not authority for propositions not considered” to conclude that Johnson
was not legal approval of Brady list disclosure.117  Why this axiom did not
affect the court’s reading of Brandon—where the California Supreme
Court purposefully chose not to consider the conflict between Pitchess
confidentiality and Brady disclosure—is unclear. 
Thus, the court reconciled Brady and Pitchess confidentiality by concluding 
(1) Pitchess confidentiality prevents the disclosure of names from Brady




Gutierrez, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 147. 
Neri, supra note 28, at 312. 
Id. at 312–13. 
114. Id. at 313. 
115. 
116. 
See ALADS, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 71. 
See id. at 76. 
117. Id. Shortly after the Johnson decision, the California Attorney General, Kamala
Harris, issued Published Opinion No. 12-401, which approved of a Brady list policy proposed 
by the California District Attorneys Association and opposed by the California Highway
Patrol. See generally 98 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. 54 (2015).  The ALADS court addressed this 
opinion much in the same way that it dealt with the Johnson decision, by disregarding it
on the grounds that it “does not discuss relevant precedent or undertake serious legal
analysis in the context of the immediate case.” ALADS, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 78.
744
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Brady disclosure exists, and (3) the California Supreme Court’s praise for
Brady lists in Johnson can be ignored.118 
IV. THE FUTURE OF BRADY AND PITCHESS
In the wake of the ALADS decision, Pitchess confidentiality has expanded 
to the point where prosecutors face increased risks of regularly violating 
Brady disclosure obligations.119  On August 18, 2017, the LASD sought
review of the ALADS decision by the California Supreme Court, and on 
October 11, 2017, the court granted review of the case.120 
A. Potential Case Outcomes 
As the court has agreed to hear the case, three potential outcomes can 
be hypothesized.  First, the court could find that Pitchess confidentiality
is unconstitutional when it bars prosecutors from fulfilling Brady requirements.
Discarding all or portions of the Pitchess statutes is not outside the realm 
of possibilities. Brandon explicitly preserved the issue,121 and public support 
for sheltering police misconduct is at an all-time low, a perception the court
is unlikely to disregard.122 However, it is doubtful that the court would
 118. See ALADS, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 71–73, 75–77. 
119. See generally supra Section II.C.
 120. Appellate Courts Case Information, CAL. CTS. (Aug. 31, 2018, 7:21 PM), 
http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=2220344
&doc_no=S243855&request_token=NiIwLSIkXkw3W0BJSCFdTEhIQEw0UDxTJyIuJ
z9SICAgCg%3D%3D [https://perma.cc/N8QX-HKUD]. The California Supreme Court 
asked the parties to brief two issues regarding Brady list disclosure when a peace officer 
becomes a potential witness in a criminal prosecution: whether (1) the name and identifying 
number of an officer on a Brady list may be disclosed, and (2) the fact that the officer may 
have relevant exonerating or impeachment evidence in the officer’s file may be disclosed. 
Id.  The union, in a news release following the petition for review by the California Supreme
Court, called the Sheriff’s decision to appeal the ruling “ill-advised” and characterized him
as “cav[ing] to outside groups.”  ALADS’ Statement on the Sheriff’s Decision to Appeal the 
Brady Decision, ASS’N L.A. DEPUTY SHERIFFS NEWS RELEASE, (http://myemail.constant
contact.com/ALADS—Statement-on-the-Sheriff-s-Decision-to-Appeal-the-Brady-Decision.html?
soid=1119707513166&aid=MUJRiUOnjQU [https://perma.cc/CPZ8-BTRK]. 
121.  City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Brandon), 29 Cal. 4th 1, 12 n.2 (2002). 
122. See Andreen, supra note 81, at 888–89 (noting the effect that public opinion
towards disclosure under CPRA requests has had on California courts).  In the months leading 
up to the ALADS decision, advocacy groups gathered nearly 13,000 signatures for a petition to
allow LASD to disclose the Brady list to prosecutors.  Maya Lau, L.A. County Sherriff Can’t 
Give Prosecutors the Names of Problem Deputies, Appeals Court Rules, L.A. TIMES (July
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reverse course to such a degree.  The Pitchess statutes are largely accepted
as a bedrock of California criminal law, and dismantling Pitchess confidentiality
will fly in the face of nearly forty years of judicial efforts to protect it.123 
Second, the court instead could double-down on Pitchess confidentiality. 
It could affirm the appellate court’s holding and avoid addressing the tension 
between Pitchess confidentiality and prosecutorial Brady obligations.  Such 
a holding likely would include a re-articulation that prosecutors are under
no Brady obligation to review personnel files, a finding that is supported
by the court’s conclusions and dicta in Johnson.124  However, doubling-
down on Pitchess confidentiality would inevitably produce new and greater
problems. 
The first problem would be for prosecutors.  Without the aid of Brady
list disclosures, prosecutors would be forced either to submit Pitchess
motions in every case where a peace officer will be a material witness or
be at continual risk of violating Brady.125 With the first course of action, 
the disadvantages are clear.  Courts have noted the waste of time and resources
that accompany filing prosecutorial Pitchess motions in every case.126 There 
are also structural impediments to prosecutorial Pitchess motions.127  As to
the risk of potential Brady violations, prosecutors now face greater liability
than ever before for failing to disclose material evidence.128 
The second problem would be for those individuals whom the Brady
and Pitchess decisions were meant to protect—criminal defendants.  Prosecutors 
either have a duty to learn of potential Brady evidence in a peace officer’s
personnel file, or they do not.  If they do, the practical impediments 
to disclosure under Pitchess outweigh the risks of being caught committing a 
11, 2017, 9:45 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-brady-decision-20170612- 
story.html [https://perma.cc/JXK2-WCR2].
123. See People v. Mooc, 26 Cal. 4th 1216, 1225–26 (2001). 
124.  People v. Superior Court (Johnson), 61 Cal. 4th 696, 715 (2015). 
125. See Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court (ALADS), 221 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 51, 85 (Ct. App. 2017) (Grimes, J., dissenting). 
126. See, e.g., Johnson, 61 Cal. 4th at 718–19. 
127. See supra Section II.C; see also Neri, supra note 28, at 315. 
128. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 141 (West 2018); Matt Ferner, Cheating California
Prosecutors Face Prison Under New Law, HUFFPOST (Oct. 1, 2016, 7:15 PM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/entry/california-prosecutor-misconduct-felony_us_57eff9b7e4b024a52 
d2f4d65 [https://perma.cc/ULG7-QF5B].  Although prosecutors have absolute immunity
from civil liability under § 1983 actions, prosecutorial offices may still face civil liability
when there exists a pattern of Brady violations; that pattern is sufficient to establish notice;
a failure to provide training would result in highly predictable constitutional violations;
and those violations would be so predictable that failing to train amounts to a deliberate 
indifference toward, and conscious disregard for, criminal defendants’ Brady rights. See
Connick v. Thompson 563 U.S. 51, 71 (2011).  Thus, a failure to train prosecutors on how to
meet their Brady disclosure standards in light of Pitchess confidentiality restrictions could
provide a vehicle for municipal liability under § 1983. 
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Brady violation, prosecutors will not engage in the discovery process, and 
criminal defendants will be denied evidence to which they are constitutionally
entitled.129  If prosecutors do not have such a duty, criminal defendants again
will be denied access to potentially exculpatory evidence.  This is a lose-lose
situation for criminal defendants in California. 
Third, rather than doubling-down on Pitchess confidentiality or scrapping 
it altogether, the court should hold that the disclosure of Brady list names 
to prosecutors is not a violation of Pitchess confidentiality.  The Copley 
Press cases should be narrowed to distinguish disclosure of Brady list names 
to prosecutors from disclosure to news outlets.130 Pitchess confidentiality
should be preserved while still allowing for robust Brady disclosure.
Prosecutors would have a method of limiting their Brady liability, and 
criminal defendants would have access to exculpatory material.
Such a decision would also support a recent shift in the Pitchess process.131 
In Serrano v. Superior Court, the Second District Court of Appeal held
that neither the prosecution nor the defense must allege specific officer
misconduct to trigger Pitchess review when that party declares it has been
notified of potential Brady information in the officer’s personnel file.132 
In the absence of a conflicting decision by a California District Court 
of Appeal or review by the California Supreme Court, Serrano is binding
 129. See United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (“A robust and rigorously enforced Brady rule is imperative because all the 
incentives prosecutors confront encourage them not to discover or disclose exculpatory
evidence.”).  On November 2, 2017, the California Supreme Court approved an amendment to
the California Rules of Professional Conduct to strengthen the disclosure duties of
prosecutors in criminal cases.  CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 5-110 (2017).  However, 
the effectiveness of the new rule will likely be undercut by the systematic underreporting 
of prosecutorial misconduct that occurs in California.  Joel B. Rudin, The Supreme Court 
Assumes Errant Prosecutors will be Disciplined by Their Offices or the Bar: Three Case
Studies that Prove That Assumption Wrong, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 543 (2011). The 
problem of underreporting is compounded by the reluctance of professional organizations 
to sanction prosecutors for misconduct and the low likelihood of these sanctions being 
upheld on appellate review.  Kozinski, supra note 50, at xl, xl n.213. 
130. See ALADS, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 83–85 (Grimes, J., dissenting). 
131.  Serrano v. Superior Court, 224 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 622, 634–35 (Ct. App. 2017). 
132. See id. at 634.  The primary support for the decision was the California Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Johnson, which held that notice of potential Brady material, together with
an explanation of how the officer’s credibility may be relevant to the case, would satisfy
the showing necessary to trigger Pitchess disclosure.  Id.  Defense counsel in Serrano received 
notice from the prosecutor, who had learned that the officer’s personnel file contained potential
Brady material from the District Attorney’s online database of recurring witnesses.  Id. at 
626–27. 
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Were the California Supreme Court to rule against the disclosure of Brady
list officers, the California legislature and police agencies could look to
the federal system for a potential solution.134  The Department of Justice (DOJ) 
has acknowledged that personnel files may contain Brady material.135  To
that end, the current version of the DOJ Manual for United States Attorneys 
has adopted a “Giglio Policy,” meant to ensure the disclosure of impeachment 
material regarding investigative agency witnesses.136 The Giglio Policy
creates an affirmative obligation on the part of such witnesses to disclose
potential impeachment evidence to prosecutors.137 
The DOJ policy could serve as a model solution to the Pitchess/Brady
problem.  By adopting a disclosure duty like that found in the federal system, 
the California legislature or police agencies themselves could remedy the
Brady/Pitchess tension without having to abrogate the Pitchess statutes.
The officer holds the right to confidentiality, and the officer’s disclosure 
would not constitute a violation of that right.138  Further, under the Serrano
standard, such a disclosure would only need to be enough to allow the 
prosecutor or defense counsel to declare that the party has been notified 
133. See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455–56 (1962). 
134. A decision by the court that effectively bars the use of Brady lists could spur 
statutory attempts to break through the Pitchess confidentiality barrier, as was the case
following the Copley Press decision. See Bies, supra note 9, at 136–38.  The California 
legislature has twice considered “sunshine legislation” that would allow the public disclosure
of peace officer disciplinary records, and provide greater access to personnel files, thus 
abrogating Copley Press. Id. at 136–37. 
135. Abel, supra note 14, at 760. 
136. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-5.100 (2014). 
137. Id. § 9-5.001.  Evidence includes (i) “finding[s] of misconduct that reflect[]
upon the truthfulness or possible bias of the employee,” (ii) “past or pending criminal
charge[s],” (iii) “allegation[s] of misconduct bearing upon truthfulness, bias, or integrity
that is the subject of a pending investigation,” (iv) “prior allegations by a judge than an
agency employee has testified untruthfully, made . . . knowing false statement[s], . . . or illegally
obtained confession[s],” and (v) founded or pending allegations of misconduct that “cast 
a substantial doubt upon the accuracy of any evidence [or testimony] that the prosecutor
intends to rely on” or that will bear on the admissibility of evidence.  Id. § 9-5.100.  The rule
affects all investigative employees from the “Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement
Administration, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Unites States
Marshals Service, the [DOJ] Office of the Inspector General, and the [DOJ] Office of 
Professional Responsibility.”  Id. § 9-5.100. 
138. Pasadena Police Officers Ass’n v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 486, 507
(Ct. App. 2015). 
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of potential Brady information in a personnel file.139 Brady disclosure could 
take place without doing away with the Pitchess statutes or their protections.
V. CONCLUSION
The threat that Pitchess confidentiality poses to prosecutorial Brady
obligations is serious. Pitchess confidentiality is now impairing whole portions 
of Brady disclosure. In turn, this has increased the risk of criminal liability
to prosecutors and prevented the reform of police agencies.  At the same
time, criminal defendants face greater barriers to obtaining exculpatory and
impeachment evidence.  Such a curtailment of the rights of criminal defendants
affects many more than just the accused.
In light of these threats, the upcoming decision of the California Supreme 
Court in ALADS could pave the way for a state-wide system of inter-agency
cooperation that would strengthen the integrity of the criminal justice system. 
It could, alternatively, forestall a balancing of the privacy rights of peace 
officers against the constitutional rights of criminal defendants and institutional 
constraints facing prosecutors.  The court should keep in mind, then, that 
society necessarily loses when criminal trials are unfair, a corollary to Justice
Douglas’s observation in Brady that “[s]ociety wins . . . when criminal trials
are fair.”140
 139. See Serrano v. Superior Court, 224 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 622, 634–36 (Ct. App. 2017). 
140. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
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